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Abstract 
Advances in genetic technologies raise a multitude of ethical issues, some of which give rise to novel 
dilemmas for medical practice. One of the most controversial problems arising in clinical genetics is 
that of confidentiality and who may disclose genetic health information. This paper considers the 
question of when it is appropriate for health professionals to disclose clinically significant genetic 
information without patient consent. Existing ethical principles offer little guidance in relation to this 
issue. We build on suggestions that genetic information may be viewed as collective or shared 
information, and we introduce the concept of ‘familial comity’ as a fresh way to consider the issues. 
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Introduction 
Over the last half-century, genetic technologies have played an increasingly prominent role in the 
provision of health-care. From the introduction of newborn screening programmes in the 1960s to 
the sophisticated molecular genetic diagnosis and predictive testing available today, genetics may be 
characterised by its potential to offer otherwise unattainable medical opportunities to at-risk 
individuals and couples. 
As well as attracting significant clinical interest, this now-entrenched area of medicine has raised 
many social and ethical questions. Debates have arisen about the legitimacy of pre-natal diagnosis, 
predictive testing in young people and the delivery of services within multi-ethnic populations. The 
debates have involved professionals, policy-makers and academics in a range of different disciplines. 
Although this literature addresses numerous ethical problems arising in genetic medicine, much 
discussion is issue-specific. Few contributions have proposed ethical constructs that are different 
from – and complementary to – those typically employed in other areas of clinical practice. In this 
paper, we use the particular ethical problem of non-disclosure of genetic information between 
family members to consider the merits of a new and complementary ethical concept for genetic 
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medicine: familial comity. We build on previous suggestions that genetic information may be viewed 
as collective or shared information, and we demonstrate how the concept may have broader appeal. 
After presenting two case-studies illustrating the problem of non-disclosure in clinical practice, we 
briefly review some of the laws and guidelines applicable to this issue. We then discuss the need for, 
and justification of, a consideration such as familial comity. We argue that family comity offers a 
novel and intuitive way of framing the place of genetic information within families. The concept 
might be articulated as one of the ‘tenets’ of practice in clinical genetics, that is, an over-arching 
concept that enables one to reason through micro-issues that arise in individual clinical 
consultations. We conclude by responding to the criticism that family comity exemplifies “genetic 
exceptionalism,” and by suggesting some other problems in genetic medicine to which the concept 
may be usefully applied. 
An Array of Challenges 
Clinical genetics raises many issues that prompt a close examination of the ethical principles that 
inform practice in this area of medicine. In addition to the issues raised above, ethical and policy 
challenges have also arisen in relation to the storage of population-specific genetic information in 
biobanks, and whether it is ever acceptable to report genetic test results under a research protocol 
[8]. One property of genetic information underpinning the emergence of concerns such as these is 
its ability to yield predictive health information not only about an individual but also his or her 
genetic relatives. Whether properties such as this render genetic information exceptional is 
contested, and we discuss this further below. 
One of the most controversial problems arising in clinical genetics is that of confidentiality and who 
may disclose genetic health information. Specifically, one question concerns under what 
circumstances, if any, it is appropriate for health professionals to disclose clinically significant genetic 
information without patient consent. Consider the following actual cases, which were reported in 
the popular press: 
    A dying Melbourne man in his 20s could not be warned that he might be carrying a genetic 
mutation that causes bowel cancer. A second man from another Melbourne family faces a 50–50 
prospect of survival after developing the same disease. The second man’s parents knew of the 
family’s history of the disease but did not tell their son. Both men were not told of their disease risk 
[by their respective health professionals] because under Australian laws only relatives have the right 
to pass on sensitive family information. In both cases, the cancers could have been cured if 
diagnosed early enough [23]. 
    [Caroline, 28,] learnt last February that the lump she found in her right breast was cancerous.. 
Upsetting as the news was for someone so young, it was not as shocking as what happened next. 
She discovered that what had caused her cancer had been known to doctors and other family 
members for some years. But no one had thought to tell her. Had...she had access to her family’s 
medical history, there is every reason to think she would have been diagnosed earlier. The missing 
detail from Caroline’s medical history was only revealed after her consultant recommended she 
should have a genetic test. It was while waiting for the results that she learnt that a similar test had 
been carried out on another branch of the family several years earlier, which had established that 
her grandmother carried a faulty gene [17]. 
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In both of these cases, those affected by non-disclosure have inherited genetic mutations which 
predispose them to cancer. The men in the first scenario have inherited a mutation in the gene 
responsible for familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP), which predisposes individuals to bowel 
cancer. If the genetic mutation is known, appropriate surveillance or clinical intervention will 
increase the chances of early detection and treatment (or avoidance) of the cancer [11, 21, 27]. 
Withholding this information may be detrimental to a genetic relative’s health because if they do 
carry the mutation and do not undergo regular surveillance or elect to have a colectomy, they will 
almost certainly develop bowel cancer. 
In the second scenario, Caroline has inherited a mutation in a breast cancer gene (either BRCA1 or 
BRCA2). Carriers of mutations in these genes have an up to 80% risk of developing breast cancer by 
age 80 [10]. Whilst surveillance is not as effective as for FAP, Caroline could have reduced her risk of 
developing breast cancer through regular mammography, clinical breast examination or prophylactic 
mastectomy. 
Non-disclosure between family members seldom occurs. Situations in which a health professional 
contemplates a breach of confidentiality are even rarer (they are often due to practical constraints, 
e.g., lack of contact details for relatives). This issue is nevertheless ethically significant [6]. Non-
disclosure challenges the central ethical principles guiding practice in clinical genetics and prompts a 
re-evaluation of the interface between clinical practice and dominant theories of medical ethics as 
they apply to genetics. As we will discuss below, scenarios like these might be avoided if the ethical 
principle of family comity were observed in the practice of genetic medicine. 
Confidentiality: Regulation and Clinical Practice 
Confidentiality is a cornerstone of all medical practice. Respecting confidentiality promotes patient 
autonomy, upholds an implied promise and demonstrates virtuous professional conduct. Breaches 
of confidentiality may give rise to serious consequences, including a loss of trust in the professional–
patient relationship, and potential legal liability. 
In most jurisdictions, clinical best practice guidelines and legislation designed to protect privacy or 
data stipulate that when genetic information is to be shared with family members, the most 
appropriate person to do the sharing is the individual who has undergone the genetic test [20]. But 
as the above case-studies illustrate, the information is not always passed on. Communication of 
genetic information is a complex issue and appears to be mediated by a variety of factors including 
the following: family members may have lost touch with each other; they may not be 
communicating with each other because of a dispute; or there may be other complications, such as a 
suspicion of misattributed paternity [19]. An individual’s duty of disclosure may conflict with a desire 
to protect kin from distress, and from reluctance to convey bad news. 
Strategies for managing these issues vary throughout clinical practice but have been found to 
include the following: placing the responsibility of disclosure onto a third party; delaying disclosure 
temporarily or permanently; waiting until ‘the time is right,’ and disclosing only to selected family 
members [6, 13, 28]. Some have argued that given the potential difficulties and inevitable 
inefficiency associated with disclosure by patients, health professionals should be free to convey 
critically important health information to the patient’s relatives without the patient’s consent [7]. 
Recent literature in clinical genetics has questioned the current paradigm of individual control over 
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genetic information [4, 15]. Yet many instances of non-disclosure may be due simply to a break in 
the chain of communication rather than to an explicit refusal to pass on genetic information. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission Report (ALRC) on the protection of genetic information 
recommends liberalisation of the current restrictive approach. Recommendation 21-1 in the ALRC 
Report Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic Information in Australia states that 
amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 should be made to permit health disclosure of genetic 
information by professionals without consent in circumstances where there is a threat to life or 
health [2]. The Australian National Health Privacy Code is also currently being drafted. In its present 
form, the Code allows for disclosure of an individual’s health information which is or could be 
predictive at any time of the health of another individual. It proposes that disclosure should occur 
only in situations where an organisation reasonably believes that this is necessary to lessen or 
prevent a serious threat to that other individual’s health or life, and where all reasonable steps to 
obtain consent of the first individual have been taken. Further, the individual to whom the 
information directly pertains will need to be given adequate warning that such a disclosure will take 
place [2]. 
The American Society for Human Genetics has published comprehensive guidance on confidentiality 
in clinical genetics practice [1]. It recommends a permissive and discretionary approach to 
disclosure, but stresses that it should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Certain 
conditions should be met before disclosure, including the following: there should be a serious, 
imminent, foreseeable and serious harm to an identifiable relative, and the disease must be 
preventable, treatable or able to be monitored. 
In the United Kingdom, the Joint Committee on Medical Genetics (a committee of the British Society 
of Human Genetics and the Royal Colleges of Physicians and Pathologists) is soon to publish a report 
examining issues of confidentiality in clinical genetics. Until then, health professionals working in 
genetics must conform to the same guidelines as other health professionals; namely the Data 
Protection Act (1998) and confidentiality guidelines published by the General Medical Council [7]. 
Anecdotally, the experience of one of this paper’s authors (AN) suggests that clinicians are in 
practice reticent to breach confidentiality in the absence of clear legal precedent. 
The Need for Familial Comity 
If the recommendations of the draft Australian National Health Privacy Code are adopted, health 
professionals in Australian clinical genetics services will have a greater range of options. As well as 
facilitating their consultands’ autonomous decision to share information with other family members, 
they will gain the discretion to disclose information to the patient’s relatives if the patient does not 
do so. 
This development may not be greeted with universal enthusiasm, given the increase in responsibility 
it occasions. Encouraging autonomous decision-making by consultands occupies a central role in 
doctor–patient relationships and underpins confidentiality; it is a necessary foundation for open 
dialogue between clinician and patient [12]. In genetics this is evidenced by the centrality of non-
directive counselling in which the genetic counsellor’s role is to provide information and support 
that will allow the patient to make decisions that they feel are right for themselves and their family 
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[29]. At the same time, it is commonly recognised in clinical genetics that strict adherence to the 
principle of respect for patient autonomy may not always be appropriate. 
In response to these tensions, clinical genetics should balance an individualistic conception of 
autonomy with a more relational and communitarian one that encourages people to take account of 
their responsibilities to others [3]. This relational approach already informs practice to the extent 
that clinicians may encourage disclosure, and in response, many patients choose to share important 
genetic information with family members out of a sense of familial responsibility [13]. 
A related, broader view is gaining in popularity, namely, that information gained through genetic 
testing should be seen to belong to a family rather than to an individual alone [27]. Parker and 
Lucassen suggest that genetic information may be viewed either as ‘personal’ information or 
information which belongs to a ‘joint account’ [24]. A ‘joint account’ assumes that information 
should be available to all genetic relatives unless there is good reason assume otherwise. This places 
the ethical principles of justice and reciprocity at the heart of decision making [24]. Managing a ‘joint 
account’ in clinical practice may be difficult at first, but this is not sufficient reason to dismiss the 
idea. 
If genetic information is to be viewed as common or shared, then it may be useful to articulate a 
new concept to capture this notion. In 2002, The Human Genetics Commission in the United 
Kingdom proposed a concept of “genetic solidarity and altruism” [15]. This recognises that genetic 
information binds people together, and that this common bond requires altruistic behaviour on the 
part of each individual to ensure that common good is promoted. 
Taking solidarity and altruism further, we propose the supplementary concept of familial comity. 
‘Comity’ is considerate behaviour towards others. This principle is intended to reflect the notion of 
relational autonomy (i.e., the notion that an individual’s personal autonomy should be considered in 
relation to their responsibilities to others [3]), and the social responsibility that should be attached 
to genetic information, which is hereditary in nature. Comity provides a useful counterbalance to the 
principle of autonomy, and supports a ‘joint account’ approach to the practice of clinical genetics 
[24]. 
Whilst clinicians should respect individual patient autonomy to the greatest extent possible, the 
principle of familial comity demands that the implications of genetic information for genetic relatives 
should also be routinely considered. In circumstances such as that illustrated by the cases above, 
individual patients should still be encouraged to disclose information where this is warranted. If they 
do not do so, the principle of familial comity could be used to justify further disclosure of that 
information by health professionals. Studies already reveal that whilst genetic counsellors currently 
uphold patient autonomy above other ethical obligations to genetic relatives [9], they will often take 
further steps to ensure that significant information is disclosed in situations where they believe this 
may not happen [18]. Professional codes also encourage clinicians to strike a balance between 
upholding confidentiality and addressing the needs of genetic relatives [16]. Practicalities may 
interfere with the observance of this principle. The clinical team may simply have no means of 
identifying the proband’s relatives, for example. 
Familial comity does not merely state that people should be considerate to one another. The 
concept is intended to provide an over-arching tenet of clinical genetics one which can be useful 
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over a number of domains. It offers room for new approaches to familiar problems, without 
requiring weighing of principles, and it applies to both professionals and families. It will be easy to 
translate this principle into everyday clinical practice, and it will shift some of the ethical debates in 
genetics beyond classical principle-driven analyses. 
Familial Comity in Practice 
Confidentiality is not the only issue in clinical practice to which the principle of familial comity may 
be usefully applied. It may also inform decision making in controversial cases of genetic testing of 
younger children. Recommendations generally restrict genetic testing in younger children to 
circumstances where there is direct medical benefit to the child [14]. Purely predictive genetic 
testing (such as testing for Becker Muscular Dystrophy in young boys) and carrier testing (such as 
fragile-X carrier screening in young girls) is therefore generally discouraged [5]. Some have argued, 
however, that there may be other benefits to the individual and family which make some such 
testing desirable, including reducing what may sometimes be a virtually incapacitating state of 
uncertainty for the child and parents, or preparing the child for his or her future [26]. Again this 
scenario presents challenges to an individual’s autonomy, and issues relating to the psychological 
and other kinds of harm that may arise from this testing are paramount. Nevertheless, if we see the 
issue in terms of striking a careful balance between respecting individual autonomy and acting with 
familial comity in mind, this goes some way towards addressing the ethical conflict arising out of this 
issue. 
Does Familial Comity Represent Unwarranted Exceptionalism? 
Discussions of whether the features of genetic information and technologies are unique enough to 
warrant a separate ethical analysis has been ongoing for as long as people have been publishing on 
the implications of genetic technology [25]. Genetic information has several interesting attributes: it 
uniquely identifies most people; it is ubiquitous; it can be obtained from a very small biological 
sample; it can be predictive of future health, and it will have implications for genetically related 
family members. 
These attributes are not exclusive to genetics. Contact-tracing of partners in cases where a patient is 
found to be infected with HIV (or another sexually transmitted disease) presents similar 
confidentiality problems to the case studies we have discussed. Similar issue also arise in cases 
where people are informed that a particular individual living in close proximity is infected with 
tuberculosis. 
Notwithstanding these similarities, genetic information is unique in that it combines all of the 
attributes mentioned above [22]; other kinds of health information do not possess this combination 
of properties. Furthermore, it might be argued that the principle of familial comity might be usefully 
applied in the context of communicable disease control, as well as genetic information. 
 
Conclusion 
The practice of genetics presents challenges to the centrality of patient autonomy. This means that 
we need to consider alternative concepts to accommodate the ethical issues brought about by new 
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developments in genetic technologies. The principle of familial comity complements existing ethical 
principles, and provides a way to balance the best interests of the individual with the interests of 
their genetic relatives. 
Genetics is an area of medicine where new developments frequently arise. This forces us to 
constantly re-evaluate what should be considered ethical practice. Ongoing debate about ethical 
principles will help guide practice in this new area of clinical medicine. 
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